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The Preference Clause Is Fair -And Necessary
By LAWRENCE POTAMKIN*
PREFERENCE RIGHTS ARE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS
An important part of the dispute over the merits of the preference
provisions of the federal electric power marketing laws constitutes an in-
teresting study in the field of semantics. Much of the confusion in the pub-
lic mind grows out of the use of particular words-words which in their
pure, dictionary meanings do not create unfavorable connotations but which
in common usage have taken on those inferences of impropriety.
The words "preference" and "preferred" do not in their basic mean-
ings carry any wrongful connotation of themselves. There is no implication
in the dictionary meaning of the words that there is anything unfair or im-
proper in having a preference or in being preferred. A preference in its
pure meaning can be either justified or unjustified. If it is justified, then
there is, of course, no question of unfairness to anyone else.
However, in common usage these words seem to have taken on an im-
plication of impropriety. The words have so often been used to create an
impression of unfairness to others that the first reaction of many people is
that there is unfairness. And, of course, the opponents of the federal power
marketing provisions have not only desired that such an impression be
created, but they have gone to great lengths to create the impression.
Obviously, if you tell a group only that others are being preferred over
them, and you do not tell them why the preference is being given, you neces-
sarily create the impression that the preference is wrongful and that they
are, therefore, being discriminated against. This has been one method used
in the attack against the preference provisions of the power marketing laws.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basic principle underlying
the preference provisions and to demonstrate that the preference involved
therein is a preference in the pure meaning of the word and not in the
popular misconception of the meaning of the word. The purpose is to dem-
onstrate that what we have here is a proper preference, a preference that
grows from basic rights.
Historical Basis
The waterways of our country belong to all the people of the United
States and are controlled for them and in their interest by the government
they elect to represent them. This concept is basic to our form of govern-
ment. Prior to the development of the science of electricity and the dis-
covery that these waterways could be used to generate electric power, the
basic principle that the waterways were to be used and controlled for the
benefit of the people was applied without question to matters involving fish-
ing, transportation and water supply. The correctness of the concept was
never seriously challenged.
Historically, the use of water for utility services constituted the first
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public utility service rendered and it was furnished by the government. As
early as 312 B.C., the Romans constructed a water supply system with
acqueducts having an aggregate length of 359 miles.
In our country, the Pilgrims developed public water power plants to
run their grist mills only a few years after they first settled at Plymouth
in 1620. The other early American colonies did likewise. Public owner-
ship and operation of water power sites along the rivers existed long before
the establishment of the United States of America. An early precedent was
set by New Hampshire, and by the Colony of Massachusetts in 1638 when
it erected its own saw mill using water power.
Where the government did not itself operate the facility, it regulated
its operation. The right to use the waters to develop a form of power had
to be received from the government. In the Colony of West Jersey, the
government went so far as to destroy a dam which interfered with naviga-
tion. Thus do we find that from the earliest days of settlement in our coun-
try it was uniformly recognized that the waterways could not be appropri-
ated by any one group for its own purposes, but that they belonged to the
people as a whole. Therefore, any use of the waterways required the special
sanction of the government so that this basic principle could at all times be
protected and observed.
With the advent of electricity, a new problem arose. How was the
basic principle of public benefit to guide us in controlling the use of water-
ways for hydro-electric generation? The problem was first faced squarely
by President Theodore Roosevelt when, in 1903, he vetoed a bill providing
for the erection of a dam and thd construction of a power station at Muscle
Shoals, Alabama, by private interests. In taking this historic step, Presi-
dent Roosevelt declared that the entire problem required a comprehensive
study so that a general policy could be developed which would "best con-
serve the public interest." He continued to deal with the problem in like
manner in other and later messages to Congress. Finally, in the Reclama-
tion Act of 1906, there was established for the first time the beginnings of
the principle which we have since come to call "preference"-the policy of
providing to public bodies the first use or availability of federally produced
and marketed power. It gave preference "to municipal purposes." There-
after, in subsequent acts dealing with power marketing, congress developed
the principle more fully and more uniformly, giving preference to public
bodies and consumer organizations.
The Word "Preference" is Misleading
It is extremely unfortunate that the word "preference" or the designa-
tion of "preferred, customers" was ever used. Apparently it seemed to the
draftsmen to be the most direct and simple way to express the right which
was being defined. In those early days of the first use of these words and
terms, apparently the misleading connotations which might flow from such
use did not occur to the draftsmen. However, once the terms had been used
in legislation, they became words of art which were continuously used by
all those discussing the matter. Again, it was the simplest and most direct
way of referring to the laws and customers involved.
Much of the misunderstanding about these provisions in our laws flows
[Vol. 18,
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from the use of these words. The problem arises out of the semantics of
the case rather than the basic truths.
For, in fact, no preference in the ordinary sense of the word is involved.
And it is the purpose of this paper td make clear what the real basis is and
to define the actual meaning of this congressional action, in the firm belief
that no one who understands the principle involved will oppose the rights
of the rural electric cooperatives and the public bodies to their status under
the federal power marketing statutes.
No Preference in Price
We should first note that the so-called preference provisions of the
federal statutes create only a priority in the right to purchase the power
generated at these federally owned installations. It applies only to the
availability of the power and not to the price of the power. Tlhus, the
statutes are designed only to give the rural electric cooperatives and public
bodies the first right to purchase federally produced and federally marketed
power. The preference provisions come into play only when another type
of user of electric power, such as a large industrial user or a commercial
power company, and a cooperative or public body both want to buy federal
power and there is not enough for both. In such a case, the cooperative or
public body would be given the first opportunity to purchase what it needs.
This is all that the so-called preference clause provides--it merely de-
fines the order of purchasers. It would be more accurate, therefore, to
speak of the non-profit distributors, the cooperatives and municipalities, as
having the first availability of the power when there is not enough for
everyone.
Cooperatives and public bodies get no price preference. The marketing
agency sets the price and all who purchase pay the same price for the par-
ticular type of power purchased. In practice, this often means that the
cooperative pays more than the commercial power company-never less.
Hydro-electric installations usually have at least two kinds of power for
sale: (1) Firm power, which is available at all times, and (2) secondary
power, which is available only at those times when there is more water
available than usual for power generation. Only those distributors who
have their own generating facilities can use this secondary power. Those
who do not have their own generating facilities must at all times buy firm
power, since they must be sure that they will have their power when they
need it. Because secondary power is not always available and cannot be
used by everyone, it is sold for a lower price than firm power. And since
the cooperatives and public bodies which purchase federal power do not
usually have their own generating facilities, they are limited to the pur-
chase of firm power. For the firm power they buy they pay the same price
as that paid by the commercial power companies that buy it-and they are
unable to buy the cheaper secondary power which is, therefore, almost al-
ways sold to the commercial power companies. The over-all result is that
the average price paid for federal hydro power by commercial companies is
less than that paid by the "preferred" cooperatives and public bodies.
This result is not brought about by any preference or lack of prefer-
ence. It results solely and entirely from the fact that secondary power is
19561
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cheaper than firm power and only the commercial power companies are in
a position to buy and to use secondary power. The result, nevertheless, is
that the preferred groups, the cooperatives and public bodies, actually pay
a higher average rate for their power than do the commercial power com-
panies.
Ownership by the People
In a democracy, the government is not something separate and apart
from its citizens. Rather, it is the representative of its citizens. It is in
effect the people themselves organized in a specific manner to perform their
governmental functions.
It follows, therefore, that what the government owns, the people own.
It may properly be said that whatever the government owns, it owns as
trustee for the beneficial use of all the people. This is true whether we are
talking about the buildings owned by the government, the land owned by
the government, or hydro-electric generating plants owned by the govern-
ment.
When a man owns an automobile, we do not say that he has or is en-
titled to a "preference" in the use of that automobile. We recognize that
because it is his automobile, he has the right to use it when and as he pleases,
subject only to such general rules and laws as have been made applicable
to the use of all automobiles generally. And if a man owns a house, we do
not question his right to live in it and to use it to the exclusion of others.
Nor do we call these rights of exclusive use a preference in his favor or a
discrimination against other people. It is merely an attribute of ownership.
The same doctrines of ownership must be applied whenever the gov-
ernment, which holds title to certain assets for the benefit of the people,
decides that it can and should make these assets available for the use of the
people.
This becomes obvious when we consider those cases where the govern-
ment is able to and does make natural resources available directly to its citi-
zens for their use. Thus it is that when public lands are distributed to the
people for settlement and development, no one questions the wisdom or the
moral and legal correctness of the rule which makes those lands available
directly to the homesteader who will himself occupy and use the land before
any land is offered to a land company. And where the government makes
national parks available to the public, no one questions the fact that where
possible the government does this directly and not by turning over the land
to private profit-making organizations for operation. And when surplus
foods are made available to the school children for free lunches or cheaper
lunches, no one questions the fact that they are made available to the public
schools and to non-profit cooperative schools, but not to the private schools
operated for profit.
All of these things are done because whenever a trustee who holds some
asset for the benefit of someone else decides to make that asset available for
use, he not only should but he must make it available first, if possible, for
the direct use of the beneficial owner or owners. Not to do this would be
a violation of the trust. It would certainly be the worst kind of wrong for
a trustee to say to the beneficial owner that the trust property is to be made
[Vol. 18,
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available to him only through a third party who will add his profits to the
cost of the owner's use.
Are there any who would maintain that because there are private com-
panies selling food to school cafeterias, the government should abandon its
school lunch program as such and sell the food to the companies who are in
that business? Would anyone contend that because there are private land
development companies the government should never give land directly to
the people for their settlement and development, but should make it avail-
able to them only through these land development companies so that these
companies may make a profit on the transaction? Could it be argued that
because some play and vacation facilities are privately operated by profit
making organizations, the government should never provide recreation and
play facilities on government land at no cost or at only nominal cost?
These activities of the government have been and still are accepted as
proper and even necessary. The basis for them is that the government is
the people; that what the government owns, the people own; and that gov-
ernment facilities should at all times be used for the direct benefit of the
people and not for the profit of selected individuals or companies.
This is precisely the situation that exists with respect to the hydro-
electric generating facilities owned and operated by the government. The
government owns these facilities, not as a company or an organization separ-
ate and apart from the people, but only as trustee for the people-and the
beneficial ownership of those facilities remains with the people. It follows,
therefore, that when the government makes the benefits of such installations
available, it must make them available for the direct and immediate benefit
of its citizens and not through the medium of a profit-making organization
which will exact its toll from the people. The stated purpose in the various
statutes dealing with the subject is that the electric power and energy mar-
keted by the government shall be marketed so as to bring the maximum
benefit of it to the people-so as to encourage the most wide-spread use by
the people at the lowest cost.
This is not a policy developed out of the abstract thinking of Con-
gress. It is merely a statement of what would be implied, of what would be
applicable even if that language were not used. It is, in fact, merely the
statement of a cardinal principle governing the relationship of a trustee to
the beneficial owner.
The federal government is not in the retail electric business. It does
not construct or own distribution facilities for the delivery and sale of elec-
tricity to the individual citizen consumer. If, however, the federal govern-
ment were in the retail electric business, could anyone argue that it should
not deliver and sell power to the individual citizen consumer before it should
sell and deliver any electric power to a commercial company to resell for
profit? In such a circumstance, it would be obvious that it was not only
proper to sell to the individual consumer first, but that it was the only
thing that the government should or could do.
The fact that the federal government has restricted its activities to the
wholesale power business and cannot, therefore, deliver electric power to the
individual citizen consumer, does not alter the essential relationship between
the government and its citizens. It does not destroy the rights of the in-
1956]
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dividual citizens as the beneficial owners of this power. For example, as-
sume that electricity were the type of commodity which could be packaged
for individual use so that the individual consumer could come to the dam
and buy and take delivery of a certain amount of electricity. Would any-
one question the propriety of a policy, in such circumstances, which stated
that the government would first sell to the individual citizens who bought
solely for their own use before selling to companies that would resell to
the individual citizen at a profit?
Yet, this is precisely the situation which we have under the so-called
preference laws. Since the people cannot individually purchase and take
delivery of electric power from the government, they have in certain places
organized their own citizen groups, their cooperatives and their public
bodies, for the purpose of serving themselves with electric power. Certainly
they are entitled to the same rights of purchase through this joint action
that they would have had as individuals if purchase at retail direct from
the government were possible. Those citizens who have placed themselves
in the position to exercise their rights of beneficial ownership cannot be
denied the opportunity to exercise those rights.
The so-called preference for cooperatives and public bodies, therefore,
is not a preference at all. It is merely the recognition of the rights of an
owner to use his own property. These public bodies and cooperatives that
the people have created to serve themselves with electric power are nothing
more than the people doing as a group what they cannot do individually-
but it is nevertheless the people.
The so-called preference provisions now have a 50 year background of
congressional approval. In the beginning, before there were electric co-
operatives, the preference was provided only for public bodies. When, how-
ever, the people began to organize non-profit cooperatives to serve them-
selves with their electric needs, the preference provisions were extended to
apply to the cooperatives as well. The principle was first stated in the
Reclamation Act of 1906 as applicable to public bodies. In the TVA Act of
1933 preference rights were extended to cooperatives. Since 1933, the
preference provisions have applied equally to public bodies and coopera-
tives.
"Preference" is a Recognition of Ownership Rights
As previously stated, it is unfortunate that the word "preference" was
used, since what we are dealing with is not a preference, but merely a right
of ownership. The word" preferences" probably was used because in draft-
ing any legislation the draftsman seeks brevity as well as clarity. The sim-
plest and shortest way of stating this right of first purchase appeared to be
through the use of the word "preference," and in the context of this use the
meaning was clear. The unfortunate consequence, however, has been that
the people talk and think in terms of preference only-in terms of the word
out of context-instead of in terms of ownership and of safeguarding the
public interest against exploitation. That Congress itself recognized this
* doctrine of ownership, and was not thinking in terms of creating a prefer-
ence for one group against another, is easily ascertained by an examination
of the natural resource laws and public power legislation.
[Vol. 18,
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The federal power marketing statutes clearly show that the so-called
"preference" provisions were not conceived as, or intended to be, excep-
tions to the basic purpose of protecting the public in their use of the public
resources-of seeing that they obtain the maximum benefits from our nat-
ural resources. The preference provisions were not something carved out of
those benefits, nor were they included as an addition to those benefits.
Rather, the preference provisions have been included solely as a means of
carrying out those benefits.
The TVA Act of 1933 says just that. In one section it states the policy
or principle to be used as a guide for those charged with the responsibility
of marketing federal power. The policy is "declared to be that the projects
herein provided for shall be considered primarily as for the benefit of the
people of the section as a whole and particularly the domestic and rural
consumers to whom the power can economically be made available, and, ac-
cordingly, that sale to and use by industry shall be a secondary purpose, to
be utilized principally to secure a sufficiently high load factor and revenue
rates which will permit domestic and rural use at the lowest possible rates
and in such manner as to encourage increased domestic and rural use of
electricity."
In another part of the Act, the TVA Board is authorized to sell the
power "according to the policies hereinafter set forth [see above] .. .and
in the sale of such current by the Board it shall give preference to states,
counties, municipalities and cooperative organizations of citizens or farmers,
not organized or doing business for profit, but primarily for the purpose of
supplying electricity to its own citizens and members."
There is the plain statement of the congressional understanding and the
congressional policy. There is the statement by Congress that when a fed-
eral asset is used by the public, it should be done in such a manner as to
bring to the people themselves the maximum possible benefits. And here,
too, is the clear recognition that, because the sales by the government are to
be at wholesale, this requires that the organizations of the people, created
by them for the purpose of enabling them to use these benefits as directly
as possible and at the lowest cost possible, must be given the first oppor-
tunity to purchase the power offered for sale.
Such a result would be required even if Congress had not said so in so
many words. Once the principle is stated that the commodity is to be so
sold as to bring to the people themselves the maximum benefits of that com-
modity at the lowest possible costs, it necessarily follows that they must
have the first right to buy the commodity, and this right includes the right
to buy it through their own service organizations just as surely as they
would have had the right to buy it as individuals if there had been retail
sales as well as wholesale sales.
The Preference Clause as It Should Be Written
If we were not dealing with statutory language and if we, therefore,
had no worry about the use of additional words in order to add clarity, this
is what Congress might say instead of the present preference language:
"What belongs to the government, belongs to the American people. The
government holds title only as trustee, for the benefit of the people. The
1956]
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public is the real owner of everything that belongs to the government.
Therefore, whenever the government decides that something that it owns
can be made available for direct use by the people themselves, it shall always
give them the opportunity to use it directly and without paying others profit
for that use. Where, however, it is not proper for the government to make
the commodity in question available directly to each individual citizen, then
it shall make it available to the organizations of the citizens created by them
for the purpose of bringing them the benefits of that commodity.
"As a matter of sound governmental policy the federal government has
decided to restrict its activities in the field of electric power and energy to
that of generation, high voltage transmission and sale at wholesale. There-
fore, the government cannot deliver the power directly to the individual
beneficial owners. This does not alter the fact that the people are still the
owners and, therefore, when they have organized their own public bodies
and their own non-profit cooperatives to obtain this power for them at
wholesale and to distribute it to them, those organizations are in effect the
people themselves acting in the aggregate instead of individually. Con-
sequently, those organizations shall be given the first opportunity to pur-
chase the power before any of the power is sold to commercial profit-making
enterprises."
No Discrimination Against Customers of Commercial Power Companies
The unfortunate use of the word "preference," and the mistaken rea-
soning to which this has often led, has caused apprehension among some peo-
ple as to whether this first availability to the organizations of the consumers
operates as a discrimination against those consumers who purchase their
power from commercial companies. There is no such discrimination.
In a civilization as complex as ours, it is never possible for any rule or
law or principle to provide exactly equal benefits for all people. This fact,
however, should never lead us to take the negative step of denying the
rights of ownership to those owners who are able to use the benefits of own-
ership merely because there are other owners who cannot obtain those ben-
ef its.
Certainly the fact that only a limited number of citizens,, usually those
who live in closest proximity to it, will enjoy a public park is no reason to
deny tha limited number their rights to use the park directly and without
paying profit to third parties. When the government makes public lands
available for settlement and development by individual citizens, obviously
the number who can take advantage of such an offer is small compared to
the number who would like to but cannot, and it is infinitestimal compared
to the full number of the citizens who own that land through their govern-
ment. Surely, however, it cannot be argued that because of this no citizen
should be given the right to settle and develop the land directly but that,
instead, it should all be turned over to land development companies.
It is a function of our government to use our natural resources for the
direct and maximum benefit of the people. It can, of course, do that only
where the natural resources exist. It follows that the people living in the
area where the natural resource exists will get the first and most direct
benefit from it. This is a necessary and unavoidable circumstance, and ad-
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vances no reason why such immediate and direct benefit should be denied
to those citizen owners who can use it.
The reverse of the benefit situation also exists and has not been ques-
tioned. The same water resources of the country which, when properly
harnessed, can bring such great benefits often, when not properly harnessed,
bring disaster. The devastating floods of recent years are a fresh reminder
of that fact. When disaster strikes through these natural resources the
federal government has stepped in to try to alleviate the suffering and
property damage that result. Special measures are taken for the immedi-
ate and direct benefit of the area involved and the people in the area. T1hat
this is a proper function of our government has not been questioned. We
do not hear of any organized campaign against such action by the govern-
ment in such cases, despite the fact that the action taken by the government
in such cases means action on behalf of limited areas and limited numbers
of people. In other words, the test has never been and cannot be whether
the government action involved is for the immediate and direct benefit of
everyone, or only some.
Similarly, the mere fact that all citizens cannot share immediately and
directly in the benefits of a natural resource is no reason to deny to those
citizens who can make such use the right to do so. If this were done, our
natural resources would be put to use only at the whim of those whose
primary purpose was to exploit the natural resource for a maximum of
profit and the public interest would become secondary. The ownership of
these natural resources would be transferred from the people to these pri-
vate corporations.
The fundamental and controlling fact of life in every case involving
the development of natural resources is that there will necessarily be some
citizens who benefit more directly. And there will always be some who
cannot obtain direct benefit from the natural resource. This must not, how-
ever, be permitted to affect adversely the rights of those citizens who, either
by chance or by special effort, have placed themselves in a position where
they can make direct use of the benefits offered by the government. The
inability of some owners to use the jointly-owned property must not be
made the basis for denying the rights of their ownership to those owners
who can use it. Such a denial would be discrimination--discrimination in
its grossest form-since it would deny to an owner his fundamental rights
of ownershp. There can be no question of discrimination in offering to the
people themselves the first availability of the federally marketed power
which they own. But if that first availability were denied them, then, in-
deed, would there be discrimination, but against them and not against com-
mercial power companies and their consumers.
It is thus apparent that no preference is involved in the preference
clause. The preference clause is merely a brief statement, unfortunate in
its choice of language, which recognizes the fact that in the final analysis
the people are the real owners of whatever the government owns and that,
therefore, the people themselves, through their own electrical service organ-
izations created by them for that purpose, should have the first opportunity
of purchasing the electric power and energy which the government, as trus-
tee for the people, is offering to sell.
1956]
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FALSE ISSUES RAISED BY THE POWER COMPANIES
This discussion of the "preference clause" has been limited to a con-
sideration of the theory underlying it-to a demonstration that it is based
upon the most elementary and fundamental principles of our type of society.
There are, however, other important principles related to and involved in
this issue which must be discussed. Let us not pull this preference issue
out of context and discuss it in a vacuum. Let us place the discussion in
its proper setting.
Power Companies Are Not a Part of the Free Enterprise System
The preference issue has been raised by the private power companies.
These companies claim that the preference provisions are unfair to them
and therefore to their customers. Thus it becomes necessary to consider
the nature and function of a public utility such as a power company.
The electric power company is a monopoly, authorized to furnish a
necessary service to the public. It is legally sanctioned and legally pro-
tected, but it is nevertheless a monopoly. As a monopoly, it is not part of
the free enterprise system.
The two basic elements of the free enterprise system are (1) the right
to earn greater profits through superior functioning-through greater ef-
ficiency, originality and vision-and (2) the regulating effect of competi-
tion. The drive for profits is what makes the system tick. It is the motivat-
ing force that makes the businessman constantly seek more efficient methods
of operation and improved production and service. On the other hand, the
profit motive alone might lead only to gouging the public. It must be kept
within reasonable bounds-it must be regulated. And competition does this.
To make more money, the businessman must do a better job than his com-
petitor, so he is always trying to do that better job. But his competitor is
doing the same thing. Therefore, prices cannot get out of hand. As long
as there is full and free competition, the public can take its business else-
where if one businessman raises his prices out of reason. And if the service
rendered by a businessman becomes inferior, the public can go to his com-
petitors. This is our free enterprise system.
Obviously, the electric power company is not part of that system. It
does not operate under either of the basic elements of the free enterprise
system. It is not entitled to earn unlimited profits nor is it subject to com-
petition. Its rate of return is fixed for it by a regulatory body and rate
schedules are determined which are calculated to produce that rate of re-
turn. If the system operated perfectly, the electric power company would
end its year with an exact, predetermined net income. And this is what it
is entitled to earn whether it operates efficiently or inefficiently. It is not
entitled to any reward of extra profits. So the extra profit motive, as it
exists in the free enterprise economy, is not available to the electric power
company.
Similarly, it is not subject to competition from others. It alone has
the right to serve in its prescribed area and, conversely, all those who wish
electric service must get it from the company having a monopoly in that
area or do without it. The company is free of competition and the cus-
tomer is captive, so the basic element of competition is also lacking.
[Vol. 18,
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This is a fundamental point that must always be kept in mind in any
discussion of anything that affects the electric power industry. It is not
part of the free enterprise system and no analogies with free enterprise
types of businesses are valid. Therefore, in discussing the preference pro-
visions it is utterly without meaning to compare them with hypothetical
preferences that might be extended to a free enterprise type of business,
such as, for example, special mailing rates for one publisher as against a
competing publisher, or the government going into the grocery business next
to a grocery store. There is simply no connection between the two prob-
lems.
When we discuss the preference provisions we are discussing a public
utility use of a natural resource. We are discussing the use of water power
in the monopoly field of serving the people with an essential service. It has
no relationship to other uses of other natural resources. In a basic sense,
everything we have or use is the product of a natural resource-the food
we eat, the clothes we wear, the vehicles we ride. But these other natural
resources and their products are used in the free competitive society, and
therefore no preference treatment would be proper. This is, however, far
different from the right of the people to enjoy directly the benefits of our
natural resources in the public utility field. This is far different from say-
ing that the people must pay a profit toll to a monopoly for the privilege of
using what is theirs.
Those who oppose the preference provisions constantly make these in-
valid references to and comparisons with competitive types of business.
They apparently believe they are entitled to the combined benefits of a pro-
tected monopoly and of a free enterprise business. This they cannot have.
Monopolies have always been recognized as destructive of a free enter-
prise economy. As far back as the days of Queen Elizabeth I, the English
courts held monopolies to be illegal. The courts emphasized the twin dan-
gers of monopolies: (1) high prices and (2) poor quality of service. Only
free and unrestricted competition could protect against these, and there-
fore monopolies were outlawed. In the public utility field, an exception
was created. Monopolies were legally sanctioned and protected. But by
being a monopoly the electric power company ceases to be part of the free
enterprise system and so has no claim to the freedoms and privileges of a
free enterprise business.
No Question of Socialism Involved
Out of this completely invalid analogy with competitive business comes
what is probably the most absurd charge made by the power companies and
their spokesmen, namely, that the preference provisions invite socialization
of the power business. In the first place, just what is socialism ? Is any
government activity a form of socialism ? If so, I'm afraid we have a great
deal of socialism in our country. Is our public school system socialism?
Are our city operated water systems socialism? Are our city operated
sewage disposal systems socialism? Is our government postal service social-
ism? I think that most of us do not consider it socialism for the govern-
ment to furnish its citizens with a necessary public utility type of service.
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I think that most of us consider socialism to be the entry of government
into the free enterprise type of business. And that we oppose.
I would like to suggest to those who use this argument that they are
doing very real damage to the fight against socialism. If they succeed in
misleading the public into identifying public ownership of essential public
utilities with socialism, they may by the same token convert many millions
of Americans into socialists. After all, there are countless millions of our
citizens who like their municipal services. They don't consider those serv-
ices socialism nor themselves socialists. But let the power industry convince
those millions that those governmental services are socialism, and they may
also convince them that socialism is desirable.
I am amazed that the power industry does not realize this. I am
shocked that in their grasping for a weapon in their immediate fight against
the preference provisions they fail to recognize the greater and long range
danger of their misleading argument. I could well understand the Social-
ists' claiming that the governmental services are socialism, but I cannot
understand the power industry doing it.
May I suggest to my power company friends that their socialist issue
is very much like the little man in the poem:
As I was walking up the stair
I met a man who wasn't there;
He wasn't there again today.
I wish, I wish he'd stay away.
I wish they would join me in this wish, and discuss the issues rather
than the phantasies.
Taxes a False Issue
The socialist issue is very similar to the tax issue. We always hear
about the taxes that the power companies must pay. Since they must pay
taxes, they argue, why shouldn't government bodies pay taxes? Well, let us
follow that line for a moment. In some cities, private, tax-paying water
companies furnish the water the people use. In other cities, the local gov-
ernment does it. For the sake of "fairness," should the government be
compelled to pay taxes? Private, profit-making schools pay taxes. Should
the public school systems be compelled to do likewise? We could go on
endlessly this way, selecting each and every governmental service and ask-
ing the same question. The answer is, of course, obvious. Under our sys-
tem of separate governments, one government cannot tax another govern-
ment. So when the power companies complain that they pay taxes and a
municipal electric system does not, they are in effect questioning our entire
governmental structure. I suggest that unless and until the power com-
panies are ready to propose an entirely new system of government for us-
until they have a comprehensive plan under which state and local govern-
ments must pay taxes to the federal government on all of their activities-
they cease this meaningless complaint that a government body does not pay
taxes on its power operations.
The tax issue, like the issue of socialism, simply does not exist. What
matters it to a company operating in Pennsylvania that a municipal sys-
tem in California does not pay taxes? The Pennsylvania company collects
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from its customers the taxes it must pay. The investors don't pay the taxes
-- the customers do. And I cannot believe that this constant harping on
taxes by the power companies is motivated by any desire to lower the cus-
tomer's costs.
Power Companies Overcharge Customers
Certainly, the power companies have shown no such concern for the
customer in their other activities. It sometimes happens that power com-
panies earn more than their allowable rate of return. This means they have
overcharged their customers. Yet I have never seen them offer to return
these overcharges. When a power company proposes new and higher rate
schedules, it estimates its future expenses and income. To be safe, expenses
are estimated on the high side and income on the low side. This is fine for
the investor, but not for the customer, because it practically guarantees that
the company will make more than it should and that the customer will pay
more than he should.
When the power companies received huge benefits under the accelerated
amortization certificates, did they offer to give any of these benefits to the
customer? On the contrary, they fought to give the entire benefit to the
investor.
And talk about subsidies! The, power industry has received ap-
proximately $3 billion in these rapid tax write-off certificates from 1951
to date. Assuming a normal depreciation rate of 3 per cent a year, this
will reduce the tax payments of the companies by approximately $1.3 billion
over a five year period. How about some tears for the tax-payers on that?
The benefits to the power companies from this subsidy, over a 331/3 year
period, will exceed $4 billion. This is more than the government's total in-
vestment in federal power projects, from 1906 to 1953, of $2.55 billion. But
none of this benefit is for the customer.
And when the power companies spend countless millions to propa-
gandize their own customers, to sell the political and economic ideas of their
management, do they charge these millions to themselves and to their in-
vestors, as they should? On the contrary, they include those millions in the
expenses of operation which they then charge their customers.
No, I am afraid that the record will show no real concern by the power
companies for their customers. I am afraid that the record will show that
the power companies think and act not in the terms of best service at lowest
cost, but in profits over and above their allowable rate of return. And that
is why they fight the preference clause and raise the false issues of socialism
and taxes. What they desire is complete domination of the power field.
What they want is the complete elimination of all governmental and co-
operative power activities. Then they can really go to town!
The destruction of the preference clause would be the most effective
single step in the destruction of many fine municipal and cooperative sys-
tems. It would be a giant stride toward the complete monopolization of our
power facilities by the private power companies. It would make the final
steps easy. And with that complete monopolization we would suffer the
full, historic consequences of monopoly-higher prices and poorer service.
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PREFERENCE CLAUSE NEEDED TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE
In the final analysis, the ultimate protection of the people is their
right, if they so desire, to serve themelves through their own governmental
and cooperative agencies. This right is fundamental in our law and our
history. It must not be restricted or abridged. It must not be emasculated
by creating artificial barriers against it. We must never say: Yes, you the
people own the natural resources of the country; yes, you the people have
the right to furnish your public utility services, such as electric power,
through your own organizations.; but, to make sure you cannot use that
right, we will make you pay a toll to a power company for the use of your
own resources. What a mockery that would make of this fundamental
right!
I suggest that the private power companies stop spending their energy
-and their customers' money-fighting the preference clause. I suggest
that, instead, they devote their energy to giving the best possible service at
the lowest possible cost. If they do that, they need have no fear of their
future. But if they fail to do that, they may invite the very consequences
they fear.
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